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INTRODUCTION

AIDS is perhaps one of the most recognizable acronyms across
international boundaries. It stands for the deadly disease known as
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.' The disease is the result
of an individual being infected with the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (hereinafter HIV). 2 After the HIV enters an individual's blood
stream, it inhibits the stimulation of cellular defenses.3 This weakens
the body's immune system and makes one vulnerable to a host of
"opportunistic diseases." ' 4 The virus is primarily transmitted during

5
sexual contact or through the sharing of intravenous drug needles.
While the HIV has been shown to be capable of surviving outside
of the human body, 6 there is currently no credible medical evidence
that it may be transmitted through casual contact. 7 Since there is
currently not a cure for AIDS, the outlook for an individual after
being infected with the HIV, and developing the disease, is unde-

8
niably grim.

As of July 1, 1990, there have been 139,765 cases of AIDS reported to the Centers For Disease Control (hereinafter the CDC)
from across the United States. 9 Additionally, the CDC estimates that

I. THE SURGEON GENERAL oF THE UNrrED STATES, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED
IMMuNE DEFiCIENCY SYNDROMiE 9 (1986).
2. Id. at 26.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 9.
6. Resnick, Veren, Salahuddin, Tondreau & Markham, Stability and Inactivation of HTL VIII/LAV Under Clinical and Laboratory Environments, 255 J. A.M.A. 1887, 1890-91 (1986). The
majority opinion in Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 390 S.E.2d 814 (,V. Va. 1990),
is technically incorrect when it states that, "[t]he virus cannot survive outside of white blood cells;
if exposed to the air it will die." Id. at 814.
7. The Surgeon General of The United States, Surgeon General's Report on Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome 13 (1986).
8. Id. at 10.
9. Telephone interview with anonymous official, National AIDS Hotline (July 30, 1990). The
National AIDS Hotline is funded by the Centers for Disease Control. The Hotline receives information
directly from the CDC, which often takes months to be reproduced in print.
The distinction between having AIDS and merely being infected with the HIV is significant
from a public health, as well as a legal standpoint. The CDC maintains four groupings for individuals
infected with HIV. Group I consists of individuals who have acute infection. Centers for Disease
Control, Classification System for Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type IlI/Lymphodenopathy-Ashttps://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/7
sociated Virus Infections, 35 MoRTALrr/MoRBmrrY WEEKLY REP. 334 (1986). In this stage the patient
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between 1 and 1.5 million individuals are infected with the virus. 10

As of July 1, 1990, the number of AIDS victims in West Virginia
stood at 150, while those individuals testing positive for the HIV
numbered over 183.11
Since the disease is always fatal, there is an abundance of fear

associated with contracting the HIV simply through casual contact
with an infected individual. These irrational fears often translate into
discriminatory practices in the areas of schooling, housing and employment. The issue of AIDS-based employment discrimination recently came before the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in
Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co. 2 The court decided that
an individual testing positive for the HIV is a "handicapped" person
for the purpose of establishing a claim of employment discrimination

experiences transitory mononucleosis like symptoms. Id.
Group II is composed of individuals with asymptomatic infection. Id. This means literally
without symptoms, as no outwardly observable signs of infection are readily apparent. THE APmucAN
MEDICAL ASSOCiATION, Hoam MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 139 (1989).
Group III consists of individuals with persistent generalized lymphadenopathy. Centers for
DiseaseControl, ClassificationSystem for Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type l/LymphodenopathyAssociated Virus Infections, 35 MoRTA=T/MoRamrrY WELY REP. 334 (1986). This stage is characterized by swollen glands at two or more sites on the body for more than three months. Tan
AmRcAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Homm MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 654 (1989); Centersfor Disease Control, ClassificationSystem for Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphodenopathy-Associated
Virus Infections, 35 MORTA Y/MoRBImY WEEKLY REP. 334 (1986).
Group IV consists of individuals with manifestations from several subgroupings of illnesses
including pneumocystitis carini (microorganism causing fever, dry cough and shortness of breath),
dementia (an attack by the HIV on the brain which often comes in the very late stages of the disease)
and Kaposi's sarcoma (appearance of blue-red malignant skin tumors starting at the lower extremities).
Tam AmucAN MEDICAL AssoCIATiON, Hom MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 803, 541, 614 (1989); Centers
for Disease Control, Classification System for Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphodenopathy-Associated Virus Infections, 35 MoRTALIY/MoRBmrrY WE=Y REP. 334 (1986). Individuals
in Group IV are the only ones recognized by the CDC as having AIDS. The distinctions are important,
as some courts may classify only AIDS as a "handicap," while others may include mere infection
with the HIV under the definition.
10. Telephone interview with anonymous official, National AIDS Hotline (July 30, 1990).
11. Telephone interview with Sarah Bass, Public Information Coordinator for The Epidemiology
and Disease Control Branch of the West Virginia AIDS Program (July 30, 1990). The West Virginia
AIDS Program is a federally funded organization. The number of individuals testing positive for the
virus is underreported to the Program as it only includes individuals tested at one of the Program's
fourteen state testing centers and not those tested at hospitals and other clinics throughout the state.
Of 6,702 individuals tested by the Program thus far, 183, or 2.7 per cent, have tested positive for
the HIV. Id.
12. 390 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 1990).
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under the 1981 version of West Virginia Human Rights Act. 3
This Note will first offer a brief discussion of the relevant provisions of the West Virginia Human Rights Act (hereinafter the Act).
Second, it will provide a comprehensive review of the court's decision in Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co. Third, it will
provide a brief analysis of how other state jurisdictions across the
country have treated this question. Fourth, it will examine what
effect the amended version of the Act will have upon future decisions
of the court in this area. Finally, it will examine whether a HIV
positive individual is a "qualified handicapped person" entitled to
statutory protection in West Virginia, and the effect that the recent
Congressional passage of the Americans With Disabilities Act will
14
have on this area of the law in West Virginia.
II.

RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE WEST VIRGUnIA
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT

This section is designed to give a brief overview of the purposes
of the Act, the conduct it prohibits, and a skeletal outline for procedurally invoking its protection against discrimination.
Through its passage of the West Virginia Human Rights Act,
the Legislature recognized the importance of extending equal opportunity to those individuals in society that often fall prey to discrimination. 15 The Act's Declaration of Policy states that equal
opportunity in employment is a "human right or civil right of all
persons without regard to... handicap. ' 16 The Act specifically states
that discrimination 17 by an employer 8 "with respect to compensa-

13. 1981 W. Va. Acts 128 [hereinafter pre-amended Act]. The relevant portion of this Act was
amended in 1989.
14. AsmucANs WrrH DisABmrrms AcT op 1990, H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990).
15. W. VA. CoDE § 5-11-2 (1990).
16. Id.
17. Discrimination, according to the Act, "means to exclude from, or fail or refuse to extend
to, a person equal opportunities because of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, age,
blindness, handicap, or familial status and includes to separate or segregate." Id. § 5-11-3(h) (1990).
18. An "employer" is defined by the Act as "the state, or any political subdivision thereof,
and any person employing twelve or more persons within the state." Id. § 5-11-3(d).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/7
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tion, hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment"
is prohibited even if the individual in question is "handicapped." 1 9
Exceptions to this general prohibition are permitted when an employer's decision regarding compensation, hiring, tenure, etc., is based
upon a "bona fide occupational qualification" required to be performed by the "handicapped" individual, 2° applicable security regulations of the United States or the State of West Virginia21 or
where the individual is not "able and competent" 22 to perform the
services required of her.
The process by which an aggrieved individual would invoke the
remedial measures contained in the Act must begin with the filing
of a complaint with the Human Rights Commission. 23 Next the Commission, based upon a reasonable belief that an unlawful discriminatory act has occurred, will investigate the allegations of the
complainant.2 If the Commission finds, as a result of its investigation, that probable cause exists, and that the situation cannot be
remedied through informal means, it may then dispose of the complaint in one of two ways. 25 The Commission will either hold a
hearing on the complaint 26 or, under certain circumstances, 27 issue
to the complainant a notice of her right to sue in the appropriate
circuit court.

19. Id.§ 5-11-9(a)(1).
20. Id. § 5-11-9(a). The Legislative Rules of the West Virginia Human Rights Commission state
that for an employer to be entitled to the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception under
the statute, the employer must show that "[a]ll or virtually all persons with that articular [sic] handicap
would be unable to perform the essential functions of the job involved." 6 W. VA. C.S.R. 77-4.10

(1990).
21. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(a) (1990).
22. Id. § 5-11-9(a)(1). The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recently provided guidelines

to determine whether an individual is "able and competent." If an employee is "capable of performing
the work" and "can do the work without posing a serious threat of injury to the health and safety
of either the individual, other employees or the public," then the individual is likely to be adjudicated
"able and competent" for the position sought. Ranger Fuel Corp. v. West Virginia Human Rights
Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 154, 160 (W. Va. 1988). See also 6 W. VA. C.S.R. 77-4.3 (1990).
23. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-10 (1990).
24. Id.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. § 5-11-13(b) (1990).
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R. v. ORIoN EXTERMINATING CO.28

A.

Background
The plaintiff, Benjamin R.,2 began working as a pest control
inspector for the defendant, Orkin Exterminating Company, in May,
1986.30 Benjamin was found to be infected with the HIV in January,
1987.31 In July of the same year, Benjamin notified his supervisor
that he had been infected with the HIV. 32 As a result of telling his
employer of his condition, Benjamin claimed he was terminated in
August, 1987.33 Orkin Exterminating claimed that Benjamin voluntarily resigned his position so that he could stay with his relatives
living in South Carolina.34

Benjamin filed a complaint with the West Virginia Human Rights
Commission alleging employment discrimination on the basis of a
handicap. In response to this complaint, the Commission issued Benjamin a letter giving him notice of his right to sue. 3 Benjamin brought
the instant action against Orkin Exterminating in the Circuit Court
of Ohio County, West Virginia, and Orkin had the action removed
to the United States District Court for the Northern District of West
Virginia. 6 Orkin moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
Benjamin was not "handicapped" as a matter of West Virginia law.37
Being unable to find any West Virginia precedent on this matter,
the federal court certified the question to the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals. 38 The full text of the certified question inquires
as to, "[w]hether, as a matter of West Virginia law, a person who
tests positive for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV positive)
28. Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 1990).

29. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals follows a practice of only identifyini a plaintiff's last initial in cases which involve a sensitive matter. See In re Jonathan P., 387 S.E.2d 537,
538 n.1 (W. Va. 1989).
30. Benjamin R., 390 S.E.2d at 814.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 815.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/7
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is handicapped within the meaning of W. VA. CODE 5-11-3(t)?"
B.

39

The Majority Opinion

Justice McHugh's opinion for the majority of the court is broken
up into three different stages. First, he examines the definition of
a "handicap," and its accompanying elements, in the pre-amended
version of the Act and applies them to the asymptomatic HIV positive individual. Second, Justice McHugh distinguishes the authority
from another jurisdiction presented to the court which conflicts with
the proposition that the HIV infection is a "handicap." Third, he
approaches the problem from a pragmatic, public health perspective
and concludes with the broad holding that a person at any level of
the HIV infection is "handicapped" under W. VA. CODE 5-11-3(t)
(1981). Each of these stages will be discussed in turn.
1. The Pre-amendment Definitions and Their Application
The definition of a handicap cited by Justice McHugh and contained in the pre-amended version of the Act, states that "The term
'handicap' means any physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of an individual's major life activities."4°
Justice McHugh proceeds to parce this definition into two requirements. In order to fall within the definition, an individual must
have (1) a physical or mental impairment which (2) substantially
limits one or more major life activities. 41 The pre-amended Act did
not contain definitions for either of these elements, but the Interpretive Rules of the West Virginia Human Rights Commission (hereinafter the Rules) did contain such definitions. 42 Justice McHugh

39. Id.
40. Id. at 816 (citing W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(t) (1981)).
41. Id.
42. 6 W. VA. C.S.R. § 77 (1987). This section of the Code of State Rules was repealed and
replaced on February 26, 1990, by the Legislative Rules of the West Virginia Human Rights Commission. The Rules remain in substantially the same form as they were prior to the replacement;
however, they now more faithfully reflect the recent amendments and court decisions that have impacted the Act. Copies of the new Legislative Rules may be obtained from the Administrative Law

Division of the Secretary of State's office.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

cited the definition contained in the Rules of a "physical impairment" and a "physical or mental impairment" in the opinion. A
"physical impairment," according to the Rules "means any physiological disorder or condition or cosmetic disfigurement or anatomical loss or abnormality affecting one or more of the following
body systems: .. . hemic [blood] and lymphatic. ' 43 A "physical or
mental impairment" is defined as "including]... such diseases and
conditions as" what is stated thereafter."
Justice McHugh quickly reaches the conclusion that the HIV
infection, even during the asymptomatic phase, falls within the definition of a "physical impairment. ' 45 First, he quotes former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop who stated that, "[t]he overwhelming
majority of infected persons [who are asymptomatic] exhibit detectable abnormalities of the immune system .... Accordingly...
persons with HIV infection are clearly impaired .... [Asympto-

matic individuals] may appear outwardly healthy but are in fact
seriously ill." 46 Second, he cites a string of cases from various jurisdictions across the country with statutory or regulatory definitions
of an actual "physical impairment," identical or similar to the West
Virginia definition, which have concluded that asymptomatic HIV
positive individuals are "physically impaired." 47
The second part of the "handicapped" definition requires that
the impairment substantially limit one or more major life activities
of an individual. 48 The Rules define major life activities as "includ[ing] ... communication, ambulation, self-care, socialization,

learning, vocational training, employment, transportation and
adapting to housing." 49 The court was presented with arguments by
43. Benjamin R., 390 S.E.2d at 816 (citing 6 W. VA. C.S.R. § 77-1-2.2 (1982). See also 45
C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(i) (1989).
44. Benjamin R., 390 S.E.2d at 816 (emphasis added) (citing 6 W. VA. C.S.R. 77-1-2.4 (1982)).
The Rules state that this definition is merely designed to make clear that certain conditions are included
within the scope of the Rules. 6 W. VA. C.S.R. § 77-1-3, n.5 (1987).

45. Benjamin R., 390 S.E.2d at 817.
46. Id. (citing letter from Surgeon General Koop to the United States Department of Justice
(July 29, 1988)).

47. Id. at 817-18 (citing supporting authority from numerous different legal sources).
48. Id. at 816.

49. Id. (citing 6 W. VA. C.S.R. § 77-1-2.5 (1982)).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/7
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the plaintiff, and amici curiae briefs from interested parties, 50 arguing for the recognition of "major life activities" not enumerated
in the Rules, but Justice McHugh chose to build the majority's reasoning solely around the "socialization" element. Justice McHugh
notes that the medical community has commonly found that HIV
infected individuals are, "severely withdrawn and depressed... [and]
suicidal ...

[due to] the fatal nature of the ...

disease." 51 As a

result, Justice McHugh found that HIV positive individuals are sub5' 2
stantially limited in the "major life activity" of "socialization.
The court next proceeds to distinguish the conflicting authority
in this area.
2.

53
Dismissal of Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina found in Burgess v. Your
House of Raleigh, Inc. that asymptomatic infection with the HIV
was not a "handicap" under the North Carolina Handicapped Persons Protection Act. 4 However, as noted by Justice McHugh, the
North Carolina Act55 differs from the pre-amended West Virginia
Act in several material respects.
First, the court in Burgess compared the North Carolina statutory
definition of a "major life activity" to that of its counterpart in
the regulations interpreting the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973.56
A major claim of the plaintiff in Burgess was that working was a
major life activity. The North Carolina definition of a "major life
activity" and that of the federal regulations were nearly identical
in every respect, except for the fact that the North Carolina Legislature deleted the word "working" from its definition. 7 This omission persuaded the Burgess court that the Legislature did not find

50. Id. at 818 n.10.
51. Id. at 818.
52. Id.
53. Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990).
54. Id. at 214, 388 S.E.2d at 139-40.
55. N.C. Gm. STAT. § 168A (1987).
56. Benjamin R., 390 S.E.2d at 818.
57. Id.
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"working" to be a "major life activity. 5 8 The court in Burgess also
dismissed the plaintiff's claims that his inability to bear a healthy
child, and to engage in sexual relationships, due to fear of transmitting the virus were "major life activities. ' 59 The court stated that
"major life activities" are, "essential tasks one must perform on a
regular basis in order to carry on a normal existence." 6°
Justice McHugh distinguished Burgess by pointing out further
that the North Carolina Act contained a specific exception for communicable diseases 61 and that the North Carolina Legislature had
just recently enacted legislation designed specifically to protect AIDS
victims from employment discrimination. 62
In short, Justice McHugh finds that the inclusion of "socialization" as a "major life activity" in the West Virginia definition,
and the lack of a communicable disease exception in the pre-amended
Act, were significant enough to distinguish Burgess.
3. The Public Health Argument and Conclusion
Justice McHugh cites the fact that currently ninety percent of
HIV positive individuals are asymptomatic. This alarming figure led
him to conclude that there is an urgent need to encourage individuals
to be tested to prevent the further spread of the disease.63 If an
individual faces termination because of a positive test result, then
it is likely that she will not seek to be tested. For this reason, Justice
McHugh states that "[flrom a public health standpoint, it is crucial
for .people at all stages of HIV infection to be assured of legal
protection from unlawful discrimination." 64
Based on this public policy finding, and the medical nature of
the virus, Justice McHugh concludes that even though individuals
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
148(h)-a)
63.
64.

Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. at 213-14, 388 S.E.2d at 139.
Id. at 214, 388 S.E.2d at 139.
Id., 388 S.E.2d at 139.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-5(b)(3) (1987).
Benjamin R., 390 S.E.2d at 818. This provision is contained in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A(1989).
Benjamin R., 390 S.E.2d at 818-19.
Id. at 819 (citations omitted).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/7
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exhibit no detectable symptoms, from the day that they test HIV
positive, they will qualify for protection as a "handicapped" individual under the pre-amended version of the West Virginia Human
Rights Act.65
C.

Justice Neely's Concurrence
mhe purpose of this concurrence is to recognize and discuss the entirely rational
fears of the general public in an effort to justify today's decision in terms that
satisfy those who are legitimately fearful that the legal conclusions we reach are
not justified by science."

Justice Neely's disatisfaction with the majority opinion focuses
on two general areas. First, he cites a lack of guidance to the Human
Rights Commission on the subject of "reasonable accommodation",
and when, if ever, HIV positive individuals are "otherwise qualified." 67 Secondly, he criticizes the majority for failing to thoroughly
examine the medical literature on the issue of contagiousness.68
Justice Neely begins by recognizing the anxieties and concerns
of the general public about HIV positive individuals. He states that
the average American wants to be compassionate in situations such
as this, but that "lifeboat ethics" dictate caution when her own
health is at risk. 69 He further offers his conclusion that, based on
the applicable medical literature, the danger of contracting AIDS
through casual contact" in the work place is on the order of between

65. Id.
66. Id. at 821.
67. Id. at 819. Justice Neely uses the term "otherwise qualified" throughout his opinion even
though the language does not appear in the West Virginia Human Rights Act. The term "otherwise
qualified" does appear in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). Justice Neely
likens the terminology "otherwise qualified" to the West Virginia Act's definition of "bona fide
occupational qualification." Benjamin R., 390 S.E.2d at 826. It appears, however, that "otherwise
qualified" is more parallel to the West Virginia Human Rights Act term of "able and competent."
W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(aXl) (1990). Justice Neely recognized this parallel in Ranger Fuel Corp. v.
Human Rights Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 154, 159 n.4 (W. Va. 1988). An additional definition of "otherwise qualified" can be found at the federal level. 7 C.F.R. § 15b.3(n) (1990).
68. Benjamin R., 390 S.E.2d at 819.
69. Id. at 820.
70. Justice Neely defines "casual contact" as including contact with saliva in the form of spit
and droplets that might be emitted during ordinary speech, contact with tears and contact with urine.
Id. at 824.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

one in one hundred thousand and one in a million. He states that
this conclusion will have little effect on the average American though,
for two reasons:
1. A fear among the general public that since AIDS is a political issue, the
7
government's information may be slanted and inaccurate. '
2. The nature of the medical studies concerning transmission of the HIV (small
samples over short periods) do not rule out the probability of contracting the
disease through casual contact to a high enough degree. n

Justice Neely also comments that the vague language in some of
the medical literature makes average Americans unwilling to bet their
life on the conclusions of experts and concerned that there is something about the transmission of the HIV "of which we are utterly
ignorant." 7 3
The concurrence then turns to reassuring the public that its fears
are unfounded. Justice Neely states that the aggregate of the smaller
studies provides a "mega-study" upon which we can "confidently
rely." 74 He further cites studies finding that there are likely sixteen
HIV infected individuals for every diagnosed case of AIDS. 75 As a
result, he concludes that we are already in close contact with millions
of individuals who do not know that they are HIV positive.7 6 And,
thus:
[W]e have all had our food cooked by HIV positive subjects, had our hair cut
and permed by them, been served by them in restaurants, had them in our houses
as repairmen, and been coughed and spat upon by them in buses, trains, airplanes,
hospital waiting rooms, and the line at the Department of Motor Vehicles. Yet
unless we are: (1) practicing homosexuals; (2) IV drug users; (3) indulgers in
unprotected casual sex; (4) prostitutes or their customers; (5) hemophiliacs or other
recipients of bad blood; or (6) children of HIV positive mothers, we are not HIV
positive ourselves.-

Justice Neely also agrees with the majority that we must not
ostracize known HIV positive individuals. He finds this essential to
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 820.
at 820-21.
at 822.

at 823.
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assure those who suspect that they are infected with HIV that, if
they submit to testing, they will gain a corresponding protection
from discrimination. 8
In his discussion of the medical literature which follows, Justice
Neely presents a comprehensive and cogent argument that the HIV
cannot be transmitted by saliva, urine, tears or mosquitoes. 79 He
further states that these conclusions, "should instruct our understanding of the dimensions of 'reasonable accommodation' in the
work place .... ,8o
However, the concurrence then takes a seemingly inconsistent
turn when Justice Neely states that "[i]t is one thing to conclude
that ... it is nearly impossible to contract HIV by casual contact,
and quite another to determine the legal dimensions of . . . 'reasonable accommodation' in the face of widespread fears." 8' In his
attempt to instruct the Human Rights Commission about what "reasonable accommodation" should mean, Justice Neely clouds the issue further. He states that, "[i]t is one thing to require the telephone
company to hire HIV positive telephone operators ... and quite
another to require a Holiday Inn ... to hire HIV positive food82
handlers."
The undesirable effects of Justice Neely's conclusion are threefold. First, it ignores the overwhelming evidence from the medical
community about the risks of transmitting the HIV through casual
contact. This dismissal of the overwhelming weight of medical research on the subject serves to reinforce the general public's irrational fears about AIDS. This approach sharply conflicts with the
conclusion of the Supreme Court of the United States about the
weight to be given to medical judgments when deciding whether a
person with a contagious disease can continue working. In School
Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline,83 the Court stated that in deciding

78. Id.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 824-25.
Id. at 824.
Id. at 825.
Id.
School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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whether an individual is "otherwise qualified" for employment, the
courts "should defer to the reasonable medical judgments of public
health officials. "14
Secondly, Justice Neely's conclusion, in reality, provides little
guidance to the West Virginia Human Rights Commission on the
questions of when a worker is "otherwise qualified" or requires a
"reasonable accommodation" by the employer. His suggestion that
a telephone operator is "otherwise qualified" while a foodhandler
is likely not only takes into account those employees at the extreme
ends of the spectrum.85 A telephone operator has very little close
contact with the general public, while a foodhandler, at least indirectly, has a great deal of such contact. One is left wondering
about the checker at the local grocery store, the neighborhood pharmacist and the county busdriver who fall into the grey areas.
Finally, Justice Neely's vague conclusion will serve as a deterrent
against voluntary submission to HIV testing by those individuals
who fear that a positive test result will mean their dismissal from
employment. This is unfortunate for our society on public health
grounds, but it also contradicts the express statement in Justice Neely's concurrence that "[t]here is an urgent public health need to
have as many persons as possible tested for the HIV virus so that
HIV-positive subjects can protect others.''86
The Supreme Court in Arline suggested a more rational approach
to making decisions about the questions of "otherwise qualified"
and "reasonable accommodation." The Supreme Court stated that
the inquiry on the first question should include:
[findings of] facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given the state of
medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the
severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties), and (d) the

84. Id. at 288. See also Chalk v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840
F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (reversing denial of preliminary injunction for reinstatement to teacher with
AIDS).
85. Benjamin R., 390 S.E.2d at 825. It is interesting here to remember Justice Neely's statement
that, unless other recognized risk factors are present, one cannot become HIV positive by eating food
prepared by an HIV positive subject. Id. at 823.
86. Id. at 823.
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probabilities that the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees
of harm.87

The inquiry on the "reasonable accommodation" question should
evaluate, in light of the above medical conclusions, "whether the
employer could reasonably accommodate the employee under the
established standards for that inquiry." 88 The Arline Court then cites
instances where "reasonable accommodation" would be unnecessary, such as when it would impose a great financial and administrative burden on the employer.8 9 This approach provides employers,
employees and the tribunal deciding the question with a measure of
predictability on which to proceed. The approach also accords the
medical community's judgments the weight that they rightfully deserve.
Perhaps the main reason that Justice Neely finds fault with the
"reasonable accommodation" of foodhandlers is illustrated by his
statement that "[a]s irrational as it might be scientifically, widespread rumor[s] that a restaurant hires cooks with AIDS would have
disastrous consequences for business .... ",9o This "customer preference" defense has been roundly criticized by other courts, and is
even prohibited by the new Legislative Rules promulgated by the
West Virginia Human Rights Commission. 91 Even the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has echoed its misgivings against explicitly recognizing such a defense.
92
In Chico Dairy Co. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n,
an assistant manager alleged that she was passed over for a promotion due to her area supervisor's perception that she was "handicapped." 93 The plaintiff was blind in one eye, but believed she was

87. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288 (citing Amicus Curiae brief number 19 submitted by the American

Medical Association).
88. Id. at 288. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has provided a general discussion

of the parameters of "reasonable accommodation" in West Virginia. Coffman v. West Virginia Bd.
of Regents, 386 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1988).
89. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.17 (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S.
397, 406 (1979)).
90. Benjamin R., 390 S.E.2d at 825.
91. 6 W. VA. C.S.R. § 77-1-4.11.1 (1990).
92. Chico Dairy Co. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1989).
93. Id. at 78.
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discriminated against because the socket around the eye was sunken,
resulting in what her supervisor termed a "facial deformity. ' 94 The
court found that the statutory definition of "handicap" did not
allow for an action against an eniployer where the employee was
discriminated against solely because her physical appearance was unacceptable. 95 The court explicitly stated the following in a footnote
to the opinion, however:
Where the discrimination was alleged and shown to be solely upon the employer's
perception that the complainant's physical appearance was "unacceptable," the
employer's conduct is not actionable under the West Virginia Human Rights Act
because of the statutory definition of "handicap," not because of the employer's
so-called "customer preference" defense. By this opinion we do not approve of
such a defense to actionable conduct."

Further, Justice Workman, who felt that the majority opinion opened
the door to a "customer preference" defense, stated that the defense
was attempted during the early days of the civil rights cases and
has been "uniformly rejected ...

as a defense to 'human rights

actions."97

At least one court has dealt with the "customer preference" defense in the context of AIDS-based discrimination. In Barton v. New
York City Comm'n on Human Rights," the petitioner claimed that
he would lose patients if his colleague were allowed to continue
treating AIDS patients. 99 The court stated very succinctly that
"[C]ustomer preference can never be the basis for discrimination."1°0
In sum, Justice Neely presents a convincing and rational argument from a public health point of view that members of the general
public cannot be infected with the HIV from casual contact. Un94. Id. at- 77-78.
95. Id. at 85.
96. Id. at 78 n.1 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 87 (citing Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982);
Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981); Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways,
Inc., 442 F.2d 385,r 389 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)).
98. Barton v. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights, 140 Misc. 2d 554, 531 N.Y.S.2d
979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988), modified on other grounds, 151 A.D.2d 258, 542 N.Y.S.2d 176 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989).
99. Id. at 563, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
100. Id.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/7
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fortunately, he ignores his own argument, and, in the process, fuels
the fire of irrational fear about AIDS and discourages those who
are at risk for the virus from being tested.
IV.

OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Currently the clear consensus of opinion among the available
federal and state interpretations is that AIDS, AIDS Related Complex (hereinafter ARC), asymptomatic infection with the HIV, and
even the incorrect perceptions surrounding these conditions constitute protected handicaps. The principal legislation protecting handicapped individuals in the federal sphere is the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973.101 While the language of handicap discrimination provisions,
and the classes that they protect, vary slightly from state to state,
every state jurisdiction provides statutory protection of some type
to "handicapped" individuals.' °2
A. The States' Approach
In the Massachusetts Superior Court case of Cronan v. New
England Telephone Co.10 3 the plaintiff's supervisor disclosed to other
employees that the plaintiff was suffering from ARC.' °4 After receiving threats from his fellow workers, the plaintiff chose not to
return to work, and filed a claim alleging discrimination on the basis
of a physical disability.10 5 The court, after citing several authorities
supporting the proposition that AIDS and ARC were handicaps under definitions comparable to the Massachusetts definition, denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss t 6
In the California case of Raytheon Co. v. Fair Employment &
Housing Comm'n,t 7 an employee of the defendant claimed that he
101. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). Section 504 is the section that
is most often used by victims of AIDS-based discrimination to obtain redress. Section 504 only applies
to programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance.
102. TBE NATIONAL GAY RiGHTS ADVOCATES, PROTECTION AGAINsT AIDS- RELATED DIscRnmNATION U imt STATE HANDIcAP LAws: A FIFT STATE ANALYsIs 9 (1989).
103. Cronan v. New England Telephone Co., 41 F.E.P.C 1273 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1986).
104. Id. at 1274.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1275-77.
107. Raytheon Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 212 Cal. App.3d 1242, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 197 (1989).
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was discriminated against on the basis of a physical handicap after
being diagnosed with AIDS.10 8 Surprisingly, the defendant acknowledged that this was the reason for the plaintiff's dismissal.' °9 The
court briefly examined the nature of AIDS from a medical standpoint, including the risks associated with transmission of the virus
by casual contact, 10 and concluded that "AIDS is clearly a physical
handicap within the meaning of Government Code section 12926."'
The Superior Court of New Jersey in Poff v. Caro'12 dealt with
a situation of three homosexual men who claimed that a landlord
refused to rent to them, due to his fears that the men might acquire
AIDS."' The court, in ruling on a preliminary injunction by the
New Jersey Division of Civil Rights, stated that by a reasonable
interpretation, "AIDS and persons who are discriminated against
because they are perceived to have AIDS or be potential victims of
AIDS" are handicapped within the New Jersey Law Against Dis4
crimination."
In Barton v. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights,"5 a
dentist who leased office space from one of his colleagues charged,
among other things, that the colleague terminated his lease in violation of the New York City Administrative Code because of his
practice of treating AIDS victims." 6 The court first cited prior cases
which determined that AIDS was a handicap under the New York
City Administrative Code, the New York Human Rights Law and
the Federal Rehabilitation Act." 7 The court then held that "[i]t was
proper to conclude that AIDS is a-physical handicap as contemplated
by the [New York City] Administrative Code." 118

108.
109.
-110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1247, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
Id.
Id. at 1249, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
Id. at 1250, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
Poff v. Caro, 228 N.J. Super. 370, 549 A.2d 900 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987).
Id. at 373-74, 549 A.2d at 902.
Id. at 378, 549 A.2d at 903.
Barton, 140 Misc. 2d at 554, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
Id. at 557, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 981.
Id. at 560, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
Id.
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In Cain v. Hyatt,119 a Pennsylvania district court interpreted the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act as it related to an aggrieved
individual who was a regional partner with the defendant, Hyatt
Legal Services.' ° The plaintiff alleged that he was wrongfully terminated by the defendant after contracting AIDS.' 2 1 The court found
that AIDS was a "handicap" for two reasons: it is an actual handicap because the virus and its accompanying symptoms were physical
impairments substantially limiting one's major life activities; and,
the perceptions and prejudices that are endemic to AIDS are significant impairments. '2

While those seeking protection from AIDS-based discrimination
have suffered some minor setbacks,'2 it appears that only one state
court of last resort has expressly held that AIDS-based discrimination is not a protected handicap. As discussed and analyzed earlier
in this Note, North Carolina decided in Burgess v. Your House of
Raleigh, Inc. that an individual who tested HIV positive was not
protected by that state's handicap discrimination laws.'7
Although there are not an abundance of state court decisions on
the subject of AIDS-based discrimination, a recent report examining
the position of every state agency charged with the enforcement of
their state's handicap discrimination laws lends some guidance on
how the agencies will handle administrative complaints in this area.121
The report indicates that "The total number of jurisdictions prohibiting discrimination against people with AIDS is 40 (78% of total);
ARC, 35 (69%); asymptomatic HIV infection, 33 (65%); and per-

119. Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
120. Id. at 672.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 678. See also M.A.E. v. Doe & Roe, 388 Pa. Super 589, 590, 566 A.2d 285, 286

(1989) (Cavanaugh, J., concurring).
123. See Brunner v. Al Attar, 786 S.W.2d 784 (rex. Ct. App. 1990) (defendant who fired the

plaintiff because of her volunteer work at the AIDS Foundation granted summary judgement because
the plaintiff failed to allege that she was handicapped); Sanchez v. Lagoudakis, 184 Mich. App. 355,

457 N.W.2d 373 (1990) (plaintiff who tested HIV negative, and who was not actually handicapped,
could not recover on the basis of a perceived handicap).
124. Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 214, 388 S.E.2d 134, 139-40 (1990).
125. THE NATIONAL GAY'RIGHTS ADVOCATES, PROTECTION AAnsT AIDS-RLATED DIScREnNATION UNDER STATE HANDIcAP LAws: A Fmn STATE ANALYsIs (1989).
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ceived high risk status, 28 (55° 0 )." Further, virtually every state
that did not declare AIDS-based discrimination illegal under their
respective handicap protection statutes stated that they were merely
undecided on the issue. 127 Tennessee was the only state to declare

that discrimination in relation to AIDS, ARC and asymptomatic
infection is permissible. 1
B.

The FederalApproach

The approach of the federal courts on AIDS-based discrimination
is very nearly a settled proposition of law. The 1987 decision by the
Supreme Court in School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline2 9 held
that the handicap protection of the Rehabilitation Act extended to
individuals with contagious diseases. 30 This holding has added support to a growing list of federal decisions extending protection to
those who are victims of AIDS-based discrimination. Aside from
setbacks in a few fact specific cases,' the overwhelming majority
of federal courts have extended broad coverage to prevent arbitrary
actions against individuals on the basis of AIDS.3 2 The trend in
126. Id. at 3.
127. Id.
128 Id.
129. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
130. Id. at 285-86.
131. See Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that an HIV positive member
of the Naval Reserve has no remedy under the Rehabilitation Act); Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F. Supp.
1564 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (stating that HIV positive prisoners who were administratively segregated were
not "otherwise qualified" to receive protection from the Rehabilitation Act); Doe v. Coughlin, 71
N.Y.2d 523, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1987) (stating that a prisoner with AIDS is not
"otherwise qualified" to participate in a Family Reunion Program with his wife), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 879 (1988).
132. Doe, 903 F.2d at 1455 (stating that it is well established that infection with AIDS constitutes
a handicap); Chalk v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.
1988) (reversing denial of preliminary injunction for reinstatement to teacher with AIDS); Martinez
v. School Bd. of Hillsborough County, 861 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that a mentally retarded
child with AIDS suffers from two handicaps under the Rehabilitation Act); Association of Relatives
& Friends of AIDS Patients v. Regulations and Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95 (D.P.R. 1990)
(stating that persons terminally ill with AIDS are handicapped within the meaning of the Fair Housing
Act); Doe v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 723 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (stating that
it is settled in the Eleventh Circuit that AIDS is a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act); Baxter v.
City of Belleville, III., 720 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ill. 1989) (stating that HIV positive individuals are
handicapped within the meaning of the Fair Housing Act); Robertson v. Granite City Community
Unit School Dist. No. 9, 684 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D. Ill. 1988) (granting preliminary injunction to allow

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/7

20

Volk: HIV Positive Employees as Handicapped Persons under State and Fed

1990]

HIV INFECTION AS A HANDICAP

this area of federal law is clearly in an expanding mode, and with
the recent passage of the Americans With Disabilities Act,133 AIDSbased discrimination is likely to be prohibited by federal law in the

private, as well as the public sector.
V.

UNDER THE
THE AMENDED DEFINITION OF A "HANDICAP"
WEST VIRGINIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT AN) ITS PROBABLE EFFECT ON

AIDS BASED DICRMNmATION CLAimS SUBSEQUENT TO BENJAMIN R.
v. ORKIN EXTERMmATING Co.
As alluded to earlier in this Note, the definition of a "handicap"
under the West Virginia Human Rights Act was amended in 1989.
The 1981 definition used in Benjamin R. provides that "[tihe term
'handicap' means any physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of an individual's major life activities.' ' 34 In 1989 the West Virginia State Legislature modified the
definition to read as follows:
The term "handicap" means a person who:
(1) Has a mental or physical impairment which substantially limits one or more
of such person's major life activities; the term "major life activities" includes
functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working;
(2) Has a record of such impairment; or
(3) Is regarded as having such an impairment.'

student with ARC to return to the normal classroom setting as he would likely prevail on his claim
that he was "handicapped" under the Rehabilitation Act); Doe v. Centinela Hospital, CV 87-2514
PAR (PX) (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1988) (WESTLAW, 1988 WL 81776) (finding that a plaintiff testing
HIV positive has a disabling handicap); Doe v. Dolton Elementary School Dist. No. 148, 694 F.
Supp. 440 (N.D. IIL. 1988) (granting preliminary injunction to allow a student with AIDS to participate
in curricular and extracurricular activities at his school); Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees
v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987) (stating that persons carrying the
HIV are protected by the Rehabilitation Act when they are perceived by others as being handicapped);
Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (stating that a child
infected with the HIV is handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act); District 27
Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 130 Misc.2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d
325 (1986) (stating that children with AIDS are handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation
Act). See also Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Application of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act to HIV Infected Individuals (Sept. 27, 1988).
133. AImmcANs WrrH Dis~nuxrEs AcT oF 1990, H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990).
134. 1981 W. Va. Acts 128.
135. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(t) (1990).
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The West Virginia definition of a "handicap" following the 1989
amendment, is now nearly identical to that of its federal counterpart
found in the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973.136 Thus, the amended
definition now protects not only those with actual handicaps, but
also those with past or perceived handicaps.' 7 For this reason, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, has stated that rather than
providing less protection to the handicapped, the federal definition,
which West Virginia has now adopted, offers handicapped individuals greater protection. 38
The one significant difference between the federal definition of
a "handicap" and that of the amended version of the West Virginia
definition is that the latter also includes a definition of "major life
activities.' 1 39 This addition to the West Virginia definition merits
discussion because it does not include as a "major life activity" the
element of "socialization" that the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals relied on so heavily in Benjamin R. in finding that a
person at any stage of infection with the HIV is "handicapped"
under West Virginia law. 140 The argument may be made in the future
that if the Legislature intended socialization to be a "major life
activity" they would have included it within the statutory definition.
This argument, and others which may try to vitiate the decision in
Benjamin R., should fail for several reasons.
First, and perhaps most important, is that the Legislature phrased
the "major life activities" in a noninclusive manner. The definition
states that, "[The term 'major life activities' includes functions such
as ....

141

The Legislature could have used a more restrictive term

136. Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814, 816 n.5 (W. Va.
Chico Dairy v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75, 85 n.10. (W.
Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 defines an "individual with handicaps" as "any
has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such

1990). See also
Va. 1989) (the
person who (i)
person's major

life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having'such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988)).
137. Chico Dairy, 382 S.E.2d at 84.
138. Id. See also Ranger Fuel Corp. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 154, 158 (W. Va.

1988).
139. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(t) (1990).
140. Benjamin R., 390 S.E.2d at 818.
141. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(t) (1990) (emphasis added).
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in introducing the word "functions" but they chose not to. This is
very significant when one examines the United States Department
of Health and Human Services regulatory definition of a "major
life activity." The regulations, which interpret the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and which were drafted with the oversight
and approval of Congress 42 state that .'[m]ajor life activities' means
functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 143 As was noted above, the West Virginia Legislature followed
the federal approach very closely in amending this section. Their
conspicuous departure in using a noninclusive definition, as opposed
to the more restrictive federal definition, suggests that they sought
to allow for a broader interpretation of "major life activities."
Secondly, "working" is enumerated in the West Virginia definition of "major life activities." 144 Also, as stated above, the West
Virginia definition now protects those individuals who are "regarded
as having" an impairment substantially limiting their "major life
activities."1 45 While little West Virginia legislative history is available
for the two additions to the West Virginia definition of a "handicap" mentioned above, the new Legislative Rules of the West Vir46
ginia Human Rights Commission provide guidance in this area.'
The Legislative Rules, in one sense, define "regarded as having"
an impairment to mean an individual who "has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a
result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment."1 47

142. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987). See also Chico Dairy,

382 S.E.2d at 82.
143. 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(ii) (1989) (emphasis added).
144. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(t)(1) (1990).
145. Id. § 5-11-3(t)(3) (1990). This section is not intended to provide a thorough analysis of the
intricacies of basing a claim on a perceived handicap. Other authors have provided a profitable
discussion of this topic. See Seguine, What's a HandicapAnyway? Analyzing Handicap Claims Under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 And Analogous State Statutes, 22 WLAMErrE L. Rav. 529 (1986);
Note, The RehabilitationAct of 1973: Focusing the Definition of A HandicappedIndividual, 30 Wm.
& MARY L. Rv. 149 (1988); Note, Employment DiscriminationAgainst the Handicappedand Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HZv.L. Rav. 997 (1984).
146. 6 W. VA. C.S.R. § 77-1 (1990).
147. Id. § 77-1-2.8.2. See also 45 C.F.R. 84.30)(2)(iv)(B) (1989).
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Applying this definition in concert with the "major life activity"
of "working" produces a favorable result for those suffering from
AIDS-based discrimination. For instance, the HIV infection at any
stage was determined to be an impairment by the court in Benjamin
R.14 Today, an employer terminates an HIV positive employee based
on the employer's fears that she, her customers or her other employees might possibly become infected with the HIV. The "attitudes" of the employer toward the employee's impairment (the HIV
infection) results in the termination of the employee and, thus,
"substantially limits" the employee's statutorily protected "major
life activity" of "working." Any doubt as to whether the termination "substantially limits" the employee's "major life activities"
is resolved in favor of the "handicapped" individual by a United
States Department of Labor regulation which interprets the Federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. These regulations interpreting the federal
counterpart of the West Virginia Human Rights Act state that "[a]
handicapped individual who is likely to experience difficulty in securing or retaining benefits or in securing, or retaining, or advancing
in employment would be considered substantially limited.' 1 49
* Finally, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals might find
in the future that AIDS and the HIV infection substantially limit
other "major life activities" not enumerated in the statutory definition. The court was presented with other "major life activities"
in Benjamin R. in an amicus curiae brief filed by the Charleston
AIDS Network, but chose instead to base its decision upon the element of "socialization" from the Interpretive Rules of the West
Virginia Human Rights Commission."10 However, several federal
courts, despite the inclusive definition of "major life activities" under the federal regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, have

148. Benjamin R., 390 S.E.2d at 819.
149. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefiting From Federal Financial Assistance, 29 C.F.R. 32.3(b)(2) (1989). See also 6 W. VA. C.S.R. §
77-1-2.5 (1990) (stating that 'Substantially Limits' means interferes with or affects over a substantial
period of time"). Following the same line of reasoning as was illustrated above, an employee's "major
life activity" of "working" for a particular employer at a particular job is substantially limited when
she is fired because it "interferes or affects" her ability to work at that particular job in the future.
150. Benjamin R., 390 S.E.2d at 818.
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found unenumerated practices to be within the regulatory definition
of "major life activities."I'
For the above reasons, the decision in Benjamin R. remains on
solid footing, despite the amendment to the definition of a "handicap" under the West Virginia Human Rights Act.
VI.

THE FUTURE

The decision in Benjamin R. is significant in the area of AIDSbased discrimination, but there are two other developments in this
area of the law that will strengthen the forces opposing AIDS-based
discrimination in the State of West Virginia. One of these developments is likely to occur at some time in the future. Namely, a
decision as to whether an HIV positive individual is a "qualified
handicapped person"' 152 entitled to protection against discrimination
by the West Virginia Human Rights Act. The second development
is the recent enactment of the Americans With Disabilities Act of
1990,111 which will provide broad protections to handicapped individuals across the United States. Each of these two developments
will be discussed in turn.
A. Are HIV Positive Individuals "Qualified Handicapped
Persons" Entitled To Protection From Employment
Discrimination Under the West Virginia Human Rights Act
The court in Benjamin R. found that HIV positive individuals
are handicapped, but it did not decide the additional, and more
151. Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (interpreting inclusive state definition
based on the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to include major life activities of procreation and
raising a healthy child); Doe v. Dolton Elementary School Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 445
1988) (entering preliminary injunction for student and suggesting that participating in contact
(N.D. Ill.
sports, reproductive functions and interaction with the opposite sex are all major life activities);
Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 379 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (entering preliminary injunction for student and suggesting that procreation and childbirth are major life activities).
But see Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 205, 214, 388 S.E.2d 134, 139 (1990) (stating
that the ability to bear healthy children and engage sexual relationships were not "major life activities"
under a definition based on the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
152. 6 W. VA. C.S.R. § 77-1-4.2 (1990).
AcT OF 1990, H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d
153. AmmucANs WrTH DisA Tmris
Sess. (1990).
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important, question of whether HIV positive individuals meet the
further requirements necessary to receive. protection under the employment section of the West Virginia Human Rights Act. The aggregate of these additional statutory requirements have been codified
by the West Virginia Human Rights Commission in their new Legislative Rules defining a "qualified handicapped person." The definition states that a "qualified handicapped person" is an "individual
Who is able and competent, with reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job in question."''
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals laid down guidelines to determine if an individual is "able and competent" in Ranger
Fuel Corp. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n by stating:
In order to determine if an individual is 'able and competent,' the employer

must consider if, with or without reasonable accommodations, (1) the individual
is currently capable of performing the work and (2) the individual can do the
work without posing a serious threat of injury to the health and safety of either
the individual, other employees or the public.'"

The court, in commenting on the second prong of the test, stated
that if an individual's "handicap creates a reasonable probability
of a materially enhanced risk of substantial harm." to the individual
or others, an employer may reject the applicant.15 6 In determining
whether the employee does create such a probability of harm, the
court stated that decisions, "should not be based on general assumptions or stereotypes about persons with that particular handicap. ' 157 Further, it has been suggested that the employer must rely
on competent,
objective medical evidence in making such a deterination.1 58 Though the determination required by the above
test
will be performed on a case by case basis, 59 it is still possible to
154. 6 W. VA. C.S.R. § 77-1-4.2 (1990) (though not expressly stated by the Rules, it is implicit

in the definition that one can also be a "qualified handicapped person" if one is "able and competent"
even though reasonable accommodation is unnecessary).
155. Ranger Fuel Corp. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 154, 159-60 (NV.
Va. 1988). See also 6 W. VA. C.S.R. § 77-1-4.3 (1990).
156. Ranger, 376 S.E.2d at 160. See also 6 W. VA. C.S.R. § 77-1-4.7 (1990).
157. 6 W. VA. C.S.R. § 77-1-4.7 (1990).
158. Davidson v. Shoney's Big Boy Restaurant, 380 S.E.2d 232, 237 (W. Va. 1989). See also
6 W. VA. C.S.R. § 77-1-4.8 (1990).
159. 6 W. VA. C.S.R. § 77-1-4.7 (1990).
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make some general observations about the status of HIV positive
individuals when the test is applied to them.
In applying the first prong of the test to AIDS-based discrimination, it is obvious that individuals in the final stages of AIDS
may not be "currently capable of performing" the work required
of them. However, this represents a very small portion of all HIV
positive individuals, the majority of which show no outward manifestation of illness. These individuals, some asymptomatic and some
symptomatic, would be capable of working. At the very most, a
minority of them may require time off from work for treatment or
recovery, but the Legislative Rules of the West Virginia Human
Rights Commission state, in a noninclusive manner, that job restructuring and modified work schedules are considered to be "reasonable accommodations."' 16 Thus, the majority of HIV positive
individuals would qualify, with or without "reasonable accommodation," as individuals "currently capable" of performing their work.
The second prong of the test will focus on whether an HIV
positive individual presents a "reasonable probability of a materially
enhanced risk of substantial harm." to the individual or others.
Based upon the overwhelming objective, competent medical evidence
that the HIV cannot be transmitted by casual contact, HIV positive
individuals clearly do not present such a probability of harm in the
overwhelming majority of employment positions. Thus, HIV positive
individuals do not present a "reasonable probability of a materially
enhanced risk of substantial harm" to themselves or others, and
they meet the second prong of the test by being able to do their
work without posing a serious threat of injury to the health or safety
of themselves or others.
From the above analysis, it is likely that when presented with
the question of whether an HIV positive individual is a "qualified
handicapped person", the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
will answer the question in the affirmative.
B.

The Americans With DisabilitiesAct of 1990
I call on the Congress to get on with the job of passing a law -

as embodied

in the Americans With Disabilities Act - that prohibits discrimination against
160. 6 W. VA. C.S.R. § 77-1-4.5.2 (1990).
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not a fight

The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (hereinafter the
ADA), was signed by President Bush in late July. The ADA represents a comprehensive, bipartisan effort to halt the discrimination
against over 43,000,000 disabled Americans. 62
The ADA generally outlaws discrimination against the disabled
in the areas of employment, public services, public accommodations
and telecommunications. 63 These protections are clearly meant to
complement existing laws protecting the handicapped as illustrated
by the following ADA provision:
Nothing in this'Act shall be construed to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights,
and procedures of any Federal law or law of any State or political subdivision
of any State or jurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection for the rights
of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this Act.,"

The ADA also specifically provides that complaints filed under the
ADA and the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 should be dealt
with so as to avoid duplication of efforts or the imposition of con65
flicting and inconsistent standards of conduct.1
It is clear that Congress intended to protect HIV positive individuals, and those perceived as such, under the provisions of the
ADA. First, the defimition of a "disability" under the ADA is identical, aside from stylistic differences, to the definition of an "individual with handicaps" under the Federal Rehabilitation Act of
1973. This is significant due to the near unanimity of the federal
courts in stating that various AIDS-based discrimination claims fall
within the "individual with handicaps" definition of the Rehabilitation Act. 166

161. 136 CONG. REc. S9545 (daily ed. July 11, 1990) (remarks by President George Bush to the
Business Leadership on March 29, 1990 which was included in the Record by Senator Kennedy).
162. Ammces WrrH DIsABIrms AcT oF 1990, H.R. CoNP. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1990).
163. Id. at 1-2.
164. Id. at 46.
165. Id. at 11.
166. See infra note 132.
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Secondly, the comments of members of Congress during the debates of the ADA recognize that AIDS-based discrimination is included within the "disability" definition. Representative William
Dannemeyer, an outspoken critic of the homosexual community, and
proponent of an effort to restrict HIV positive individuals in foodhandling positions, went on the record to state that "[t]he American
people have no idea that with the adoption of this act we are instantaneously going to bring within the definition of disabled person
across this land every HIV carrier in America, every person with
AIDS. Now that is not what my definition of disability should be
including." 167
Finally, the failed attempt to allow employers to fire or reassign
HIV positive foodhandlers provides further evidence of Congressional intent on this subject. Following the deletion of a restrictive
food handling provision by Senate and House conferees, 168 both Senator Helms in the Senate, 69 and Representative Dannemeyer in the
House of Representatives,1 70 introduced motions to recommit the.
conference report to include the restrictive language. Both of these
attempts failed. 171 However, compromise language introduced by
Senator Hatch, which is now codified in the ADA, 72 does allow for
the reassignment of foodhandlers with infectious or communicable
diseases. However, this reassignment is only permitted if the disease
in question appears on a list which is to be prepared by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services within six months following the enactment of the ADA. 7 3 The list is only to include those diseases
that are transmitted through foodhandling.' 74 It is unlikely that the

167. 136 CONG. REc. H4621 (daily ed. July 12, 1990).
168. 136 CONG. REc. H4617 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (remarks of Representative Bartlett).
169. 136 CONG. REc. S9543 (daily ed. July 11, 1990) (introduction of amendment number 2119
to the Ford motion by Senator Helms).
170. 136 CONG. REc. H4629 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (Motion to Recommit offered by Representative Dannemeyer).
171. 136 CONG. REc. S9555 (daily ed. July 11, 1990) (Helms motion failing by a vote of 6139); 136 CONG. REc. H4629 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (Dannemeyer motion failing by a vote of 224-

180).
172. AmaucANs Wrm DisABrmrs AcT oF 1990, H.R. CoNt. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d

Sess. 9 (1990).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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HIV or AIDS will appear on this list, as the current Secretary of
Health and Human Services, Dr. Louis W. Sullivan, has stated that
175
such restrictions on HIV positive individuals are unnecessary.
It is apparent from the above discussion that when the employment provisions of the ADA take effect two years from now, HIV
positive individuals can look forward to federal protection in both
the private and public sphere.
VII.

The termination of HIV
discrimination in general, is
cious and unfounded biases
society have had to contend

CONCLUSION

positive individuals, and AIDS-based
simply another example of the pernithat the physically challenged in our
with since the birth of our nation.

The decision in Benjamin R., the 1989 amendment to the definition of a "handicap" under the West Virginia Human Rights Act
and recent statutory enactments 7 6 illustrate that West Virginia is
following an emerging trend at both the federal and state level. This
trend is the condemnation of irrational prejudices against people
infected, or perceived to be infected, with the HIV specifically, and
the physically challenged in general.
The question of whether an HIV positive individual is a "qualified handicap person" entitled to statutory protection against employment discrimination in West Virginia remains to be answered.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals should maintain its
progressive approach in this area of the law and answer the question
in the affirmative. However, even if the court decides not to extend
this protection, the die has already been cast by Congress and the
President. The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, though its
employment provisions do not become immediately effective, signals
that discrimination against people infected, or perceived to be infected, with the HIV will no longer be tolerated. By law in this
society the door to equal treatment of the physically challenged will

175. 136 CONG. REc. S9545 (daily ed. July 11, 1990) (letter dated May 1, 1990, to Speaker of
the House of Representatives from Secretary Sullivan).
176. W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-6 (1985) (prohibiting AIDS-based discrimination in healthcare and
edugation).
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swing wide open in the coming years. As members of this society
we should follow suit and leave our irrational and sanctimonious
preoccupations behind us.
VIII.

EpILoGuE

There is a tendency among students of the law to look past the
case names that we encounter in researching a legal issue and forget
that there is often an aggrieved individual with a serious problem
at stake. I was fortunate enough to reach Benjamin, the plaintiff
in this case, through his attorney several weeks ago.
Benjamin is married with three children and has engaged in a
monogamous relationship with his wife for the past five years. He
did engage in one of the activities which the CDC identifies as being
"high risk" in nature over ten years ago. He stated that he is interested in working, but his HIV positive status has been a roadblock
to employment because of the irrational fears associated with the
disease. Benjamin's case is currently at a standstill in federal court,
and he only receives a small disability check from Social Security
which falls far short of his medical and family expenses.
Benjamin and his family have suffered far more than financial
consequences, though. His fourteen year old son is teased in school
by his classmates. His wife is the subject of rumors as to whether
she was infected, and as a result infected her husband. Indeed, the
entire family is rumored to carry the virus, when, in fact, only Benjamin carries the HIV. One positive reaction that Benjamin received
was the initial support and offer of two of his co-workers to help
with his case. Unfortunately, one of these co-workers later reconsidered because of the stigma that he might have to endure for his
kindness.
When I asked Benjamin what he would change about the public's
current perception of the disease, he simply stated that our society
is too judgmental. Upon hearing that someone is infected with the
HIV, people will immediately assume that the person was a homosexual and, as a result, "deserved what they got." He stated that
this rationalization does not hold up when one considers the children
and hemophiliacs who are also infected.
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Benjamin also stated that the public's ignorance about AIDS may
hit close to home one day. Indeed it is certainly not beyond the
realm of possibility that a child of a close-minded parent may one
day become sexually involved with an HIV positive individual who
might have sought testing, but was unwilling to do so because of
the discriminatory consequences.
If Benjamin's story does no more than force one person to reconsider their irrational fears about AIDS, it has effectively served
177
its purpose.
Frank W. Volk

177. The information contained in this epilogue is taken from a telephone interview with Benjamin R., plaintiff in Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co. (Aug. 10, 1990).
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